Introduction
In the Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle wrote that 'It is every man's business to see justice done'. These words take on a particular resonance in post-conflict societies torn apart by violence and bloodshed. The international community insists on justice; the incoming regime promises justice; victims demand justice. In lieu of muchneeded debates pertaining to the multi-perspectival meanings of, and possibilities for achieving, justice in such societies, however, 'justice' is most often viewed through a narrow judicial lens and reduced to the holding of criminal trials. While few would surely disagree that '[i]ndividuals who play a prominent role during wartime must be held accountable for source of information, but agents and interpreters of history… '. 5 Concerns that the Women's Court would re-traumatize and exploit victims meant that several prominent women's NGOs were notably absent from the proceedings. This author, in contrast, did attend the Court, and the present article constitutes an early analysis of this recent experiment in transitional justice.
It is too soon to know whether the Women's Court will lead to any concrete results and positive change. How, then, are we to assess the Court? This article begins by reflecting on the importance of justice, and hence a logical starting point might be to ask whether the Women's Court delivered justice, specifically to the 35 women who told their stories. Yet such a question is too broad and abstract, unless the meaning of 'justice' is more clearly specified. This article accordingly takes as its theoretical starting point Haldemann's concept of justice as recognition, 'the kind of justice that is involved in giving due recognition to the pain and humiliation experienced by victims of collective violence'. 6 Analyzing the Women's Court within this conceptual framework, it argues that the Court successfully delivered justice as recognition. As the latter is largely symbolic, however, the challenge now is to turn this recognition into a more practical and substantive form. Divided into three core sections, the article's first section sets out the notion of justice as recognition and explores its utility, particularly as a counter-balance to the perpetrator-centric focus of criminal courts. While arguing that the concepts of justice as recognition and feminist justice closely overlap, both of them sharing the same normative starting point, it also seeks to demonstrate that the former has certain strengths over the latter, making it an appropriate framework within which to analyze the Women's Court. The second, more empirical section examines whether and how the Women's Court provided justice as recognition. The third section discusses possible ways of further building on the Court's work and developing its legacy. 
Dimensions of Justice

Three vignettes and the limitations of criminal justice
The author recently spent a year in BiH researching the long-term consequences of the mass rapes committed during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. 7 While rape survivors consistently emphasized the need for their perpetrators to be held accountable and punished, their stories also highlighted the limitations of criminal justice -and it is precisely these limitations that furnished an important rationale for the Women's Court.
X was raped in a camp in Konjic municipality during the Bosnian war. She was in her 40s. She has testified at the ICTY on two occasions. The man who raped her was convicted of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment.
Today, she lives alone in a small flat in Republika Srpska, having previously spent eight years in a collective centre. She takes tablets to help her sleep and she always leaves the All three women have received some degree of legal justice through the courts. What is clear from the aforementioned vignettes, however, is that criminal justice alone is seldom enough. Indeed, three particularly salient points stand out from the vignettes in this regard.
The first is that crime -and not just the crime of war rape -has major 'ripple effects'. 11 While this term is most commonly utilized to convey the fact that crime horizontally impacts on individuals close to the victim and on the wider community, it is also appropriate to use the term in a more vertical and temporal way, in recognition of the reality that the commission of a crime -and in particular highly intimate crimes such as rape and sexual violence 12 -will often continue to impact on the victim's life many years later. In other words, the injustice committed against the crime victim is not a one-time event but rather an unfolding and multilayered process. This is the context in which the work of criminal courts, whether international or local, should be critiqued and assessed. As Sajjad remarks, 'Ultimately, seeking justice in courts of law does not overcome many of the socio-political circumstances that define the realities of survivors…'. 13 Criminal trials, in other words, are only one of the multiple fabrics that constitute the complex mosaic of justice.
The second point is that in all of the three preceding vignettes, the women talked about the affective legacy of the crimes committed against them. means that Haldemann's conceptualization of justice as recognition is sensitive both to the ripple effects and to the affective dimensions of crimes in a way that criminal justice is not.
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It is also a more empowering approach to justice. While it recognizes the suffering of victims, the fact that it privileges their perspective is a crucial acknowledgement of their agency.
A further dimension of this is that rather than assuming to know what victims need, it is an approach that allows them -in the context of discussing their objective and subjective 20 Ibid, 690. give a voice to victims in order to understand how they personally experience injustice and negative morality. Part of this process necessarily includes 'the frequency and depths of the harms women experience'. 37 Yet despite the fact that there are important similarities between Haldemann's justice as recognition and feminist theories of transitional justice, this article specifically focuses on the former, maintaining that justice as recognition is a corrective to some of the more problematic elements of ferminist theories.
Firstly, focusing on an act of injustice and on how it makes the victim feel is arguably a more constructive approach than focusing on harms done to women as women. The emphasis on a meta 'woman's experience', in short, potentially detracts from and dilutes the micro specifics of women's individual experiences. In the particular case of the Women's Court, moreover, to over-emphasize the common factor of gender is deeply discordant with the heterogeneity (in terms of ethnic belonging, religious convictions, socio-economic Secondly, when we emphasize that women are victims of patriarchy, inequality and structural violence, not only does this further contribute to de-individualizing them and depersonalizing their specific stories, but it also risks essentializing women as victims. 39 To cite Ní Aoláin, '…calling women into view in ways that affirm stereotypes can undercut arguments that mandate treating women as fully engaged actors with independent, crosscutting and competing needs'. 40 The key point about the Women's Court in Sarajevo is that it sought to portray women not simply as victims. They were actors in their own right who were given the space and the support to articulate and to interpret what had happened to them.
According to Marijana Senjak, a psychologist-psychotherapist who worked with the witnesses, 41 the women retold their stories several times during the regional meetings that preceded the Women's Court; and in the process -and through their interactions with other witnesses -they changed their perspective on the meaning of their stories and found new meaning in them. 42 For her part, Staša Zajović explained that part of the process of preparing women to testify at the Court involved introducing them to the writings of intellectuals such as Hannah Arendt and Primo Levi. 'Giving the women a political education was important', she underlined, 'for allowing them to reflect on their own experiences and to 38 Haldemann emphasizes that 'To recognize the victims is to manifest an affirmative attitude to them, directly and specifically, in response to their special situation'. Haldemann, supra n 6 at 698. Haldemann's concept of justice as recognition, it is entirely appropriate to assess the Women's Court -a feminist project -within this theoretical framework.
Assessing the Women's Court
The establishment of the court
43 Personal interview, Belgrade, Serbia, 10 June 2015.
44 According to De Grieff, 'The type of recognition that is relevant is one that acknowledges the victims' status as victims and the abuses to which they were subject, gives public space to their stories, and tries to reverse the marginalisation which they typically suffer. But this is not all. In fact, it is even more important to recognize their status as rights bearers, ultimately, as co-participants in a common political project, that is, as citizens'. Pablo de Grieff, 'Transitional Justice and Development', 2009, http://www.developmentideas.info/website/wpcontent/uploads/Ch24_TransitionalJustice_PablodeGreiff_2013.pdf (accessed 3 July 2015), 22-23. 45 Ní Aoláin, supra n 37 at 226-227. 46 Ibid, 228. violence is a very patriarchal approach that treats women as sexual objects'. She further explained that 'There has been a dangerous tendency to "sexualize" the war in BiH, but you cannot reduce the problems of women to sexual violence. You not only ignore the broader context of structural violence against women, but you also ignore the very practical needs of women'. 56 Moreover, to over-emphasize the theme of sexual violence risks de-individualizing women, reducing them to a mere number, and indeed this is a common feminist criticism of international criminal courts.
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Ultimately, the Women's Court embodied a rich thematic diversity, and this made it a significant 'enabling space' 58 for women with different experiences of violence and injustice to tell their stories. Furthermore, it allowed them to tell these stories in their own words, as individuals, without any questions or interruptions, and to focus on what was personally most important to them. To protect the women, journalists were not permitted to attend the Women's Court (but they were invited to morning press conferences). Although members of the Women in Black filmed the entire event, the careful positioning of five cameras was intended to ensure that the filming was done in a highly sensitive and unobtrusive way.
Overwhelmed with emotion, two of the witnesses were unable to finish their stories.
Some of them spoke at considerable length, unable to say everything that they wanted to in the suggested 15 minutes. Some of the stories were extremely difficult to listen to; some highlighted issues that have until now received little attention (like the forced mobilization of men in Serbia during the 1990s). 61 More than anything, these reflections provided a 'breathing space', a brief respite from the intensity and emotion of the witnesses' stories.
The women's court and the conferral of justice as recognition
According to Haldemman's theorization, the essence of justice as recognition is the reversal of the victim's symbolic devaluation. 62 Analyzing the Women's Court within this conceptual forces captured 700 Bosniak men in Zvornik, including her husband. Afraid that her 14-yearold son would also be taken away, she begged one of the Serb soldiers to spare him. To prove her son's age, she showed the soldier his medical card. That day was the last time 59 A woman from Foča explained that it was exactly 23 years ago that she last saw her husband and that his body has never been found. Similarly, a witness from Srebrenica began her story by noting that it was 23 years ago to the day that paramilitaries, led by the notorious warlord Željko Raznatović (a.k.a. Arkan), forced their way into her home and murdered her husband. 60 Honneth and Margalit, supra n 18 at 119. 61 See http://www.zenskisud.org/en/Metodologija.html (accessed 9 May 2015). 62 Haldemann, supra n 6 at 679. 63 Ibid, 734.
that she ever saw her husband. Ten years later, the remains of his body were found and she buried him. Her brother was also killed during the Bosnian war. For her, everything disappeared in a day. She now lives alone with her son and daughter, and feels immense guilt that she did not endeavour to save her husband. Her son was more valuable to her, she admitted, and she prays to her husband every night to ask for his understanding and forgiveness. For her part, a woman from Srebrenica, who was imprisoned in a camp in the municipality of Bratunac, described how it made her feel to be subjected to multiple rapes when she was 15 years old. They hurt her body and left a deep scar on her soul, she Bijelovac, in the municipality of Bratunac, described her two-year struggle to regain possession of the house from which she and her family were expelled in 1992. She 64 The testimonies of the four women who spoke at the Women's Court specifically about their experiences of war rape support Mertus' argument that 'In a non-legal setting, a rape survivor would tell a much different story, focusing not on the perpetrator, but on her feelings and fears…'. Mertus, supra n 31 at 115. 65 Haldemann, supra n 6 at 680. 66 Ní Aoláin, supra n 37 at 227. her battle to find out the facts surrounding her husband's murder in 1991; a Roma woman from Niš in Serbia spoke not only as a victim of discrimination but also as a human rights activist; and a mother from Leskovac in Serbia whose two sons were forcibly mobilized to fight in Kosovo in 1999 described her struggle to have her youngest son released from the army, her participation in spontaneous popular protests in Leskovac and her post-war activism on the issue of forced mobilization.
As previously noted, four women spoke at the Women's Court specifically about their experiences of sexual violence (a fifth woman, from Croatia, revealed that she was raped in 1991, although this was not the main focus of her story). Franke notes that '…narrating sexual violation according to the strict rules of legal testimony renders it all the more difficult for these victims to script new social possibilities and to claim a self who has a future, and is not tethered to a painful past'. 70 The Women's Court, in contrast, enabled those who had been raped to demonstrate that notwithstanding their painful pasts, they also had a futureand future goals. A woman from the municipality of Foča, for example, disclosed that her life wish is to return to her pre-war village, to re-build her home (which was destroyed during the war) and to call it the 'House of Pride', thereby reflecting her sense of inner strength as a woman who has survived the physical and psychological trauma of rape. A witness from Srebrenica similarly expressed a sense of pride, describing herself as a strong woman and a heroine who, despite everything that she has been through -from rape to domestic violence, verbal abuse from her neighbours and extreme economic hardship -is still alive and fighting. From now on, she has decided that she will only do things in life that make her happy. To great applause from the audience, she emphasized: 'A part of my childhood was taken away from me, but I will not give up on the present and future'. Ultimately, thus, what the Court recognized was the women's courage and tenacity -and hence their contributions to transitional justice as a process which is both top-down and bottom-up.
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70 Franke, supra n 3 at 823. 71 Björkdahl and Selimović, supra n 15 at 171.
If, as this article has sought to demonstrate, the Women's Court clearly delivered justice as recognition by reversing the witnesses' symbolic devaluation, questions nevertheless arise concerning the ethnic balance of this recognition. As previously explained, the proceedings of the Court were divided into five thematic sessions. In the first session (war against the civilian population), 11 women testified -a Croat from Vukovar, three Bosniaks from Srebrenica, two Bosniaks from the municipality of Bratunac, two
Bosniaks from Zvornik municipality and three Kosovar Albanians. In the second session, on sexual violence in war zones, two Bosniaks (from Srebrenica and Foča municipality respectively) and two Kosovar Albanian women told their stories. Seven women spoke during the third session, which focused on militaristic violence and women's resistance. Six of them were ethnic Serbs (five from Serbia and one from Croatia) and one was
Macedonian. In the fourth session, centred on ethnic violence and the persecution of those who are different in war and peace, eight women testified. Of these, one woman was a Roma from Serbia, one was a Serb from Slovenia, two were Muslims from Montenegro, three were Serbs from Croatia and one was a Croat. Five women -a Macedonian, three
Montenegrins and a Serb -spoke in the final session on social and economic violence.
Unquestionably, the Women's Court powerfully highlighted the continuity of violence against women in both war and peace, thereby drawing attention to 'the social, political, economic forces which have offered structural support to, and thus led to, injustice'.
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One potential criticism of the Court, however, is that due to the ethnic composition of the thematic panels, it gave the impression that certain ethnic groups suffered from wartime violence far more than others. 73 Let us consider the panel on wartime sexual violence.
Academic literature on the use of rape during the Bosnian war, for example, has focused 72 Duhaček, supra n 36 at 72. 73 Indeed, the 2011 report of the Women's Court notes that 'some of women (who were from Serbia and did not have the experience of war and extreme violence), told us that they hesitated to testify, because their experiences appeared to be "insignificant" compared with suffering of women from seen whether and to what extent this narrative will resonate -and be understood -outside a feminist framework.
Building on the Women's Court and Future Directions
One of the women (a Serb from Croatia) interviewed for this research was a victim of domestic violence and marital rape during the 1990s. She was a potential witness at the Women's Court and although ultimately she did not testify (as there was a sufficient number of witnesses from Croatia 82 ), she attended all of the regional workshops and stressed that she greatly benefitted from the process. She explained that despite the pain and trauma that she suffered during her marriage, she still had to function as a mother to her daughter, to go out to work, etc. As a result, 'I could never be myself. But at Lipik [the location of one of the regional workshops], I was finally able to cry and to really be myself'. 83 Another interviewee in Croatia who did testify at the Women's Court described what she herself gained from the experience. She enjoyed meeting and spending time with the other witnesses, she made new friendships and the process helped her both to tell her own story (she fought for 15 years to reclaim her apartment from a Croatian war veteran) and to hear the stories of other women. 84 A third interviewee in Croatia, who also testified at the Women's Court, told the author that it was being involved in this transitional justice process that gave her the courage and strength to reveal, after more than two decades, that she was raped by a Croatian That the Court took place only very recently means that its International Board is yet to deliver its final conclusions and recommendations. In pre-empting these, it is this author's contention that the next step should be to consider two fundamental and inter-linked questions. Firstly, how can we build on and maintain the solidarity that the Court embodied?
Secondly, how can we translate the justice as recognition that it delivered into something more concrete and long-lasting?
Turning to the first question, solidarity is a process rather than a state, 'a project that is forged through political struggle'. 88 The core of this struggle, according to Steans, is 'an effort to secure a basis for unity in the midst of differences'. It is precisely these needs that potentially provide a basis for a more enduring solidarity. If, as Rimmer argues, '…transitional justice outcomes that benefit women are unattainable unless the full realities of their lives before and after the conflict are understood', 92 continuing dialogue and exchange are essential, focused not just on the harms suffered but on common cross-ethnic needs such as existential security, employment and opportunities to socialize. This is consistent with Bell and O'Rourke's emphasis on 'the need to approach transitional justice projects from the question of how best to pursue the inevitably internally contested political project of securing material gains for women through periods of transition'. 93 The identification of needs, in turn, can potentially help to create more practical forms of solidarity. Kent, for example, describes how in East Timor, the members of various widows' groups 'also assist one another in practical ways by engaging in collective economic activities, such as working in each other's fields and establishing cooperatives to sell products such as cassava and rice' 94 .
Haldemann's justice as recognition does not address the issue of cross-ethnic or female solidarity. One of the issues with his conceptualization, however, is precisely that it is somewhat weak in explaining exactly what justice as recognition entails in concrete terms.
Indeed, he himself acknowledges that 'A fuller treatment of the subject, which this article cannot offer, would give a much richer account of how such recognition can be achieved in the aftermath of mass atrocity'. 95 Focusing on the creation and maintenance of solidarity, through an emphasis on needs, is not only consistent with feminist theories of transitional justice, but it also provides the basis for a more practical form of justice as recognition in which the initial harm becomes transformative rather than entrenched.
Turning more directly to the question of how the symbolic justice as recognition which the Women's Court delivered might be developed into a more tangible and substantive form, 
